воскресенье, 11 января 2009 г.

article by Dr. Stepan Grigoryan (Chairman of the Board of ACGRC) "The South Caucasus and the Experience of the Baltic Cooperation"

"Most significant components able to provide the existence of the region and regional cooperation are: 1. geographic proximity promoting immediate contact of countries in the region; 2. presence of common targets and aims of countries organized into a single region (in foreign as well as in internal policy); 3. common acceptance of main challenges and threats arising in the world and in immediate neighbourhood of the region; 4. common image and acceptance by citizens of the countries what a region is and what Neighbourhood in the region means; 5. existence or lack of regional conflicts, and also several other components".
Stepan Grigoryan’s reportChairman, The Analytical Center on Globalization and Regional Cooperation
We will compare the situation in the Baltic and South Caucasian regions for the most important of the above mentioned components able to provide creation of a region and regional cooperation:
1. Geographic proximity. In both cases the geographic component is favorable, as countries of both Baltic and the SC are immediate neighbors. However, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a region to exist.
2. Existence of common targets and aims of countries organized into a region. As it can be seen, right after getting independence, the Baltic countries defined their targets and aims quite clearly: construction of democratic countries, headed for integration into European structures, including the European Union, provision of their security within the framework of the Euroatlantic Alliance (NATO). It is very important that these targets were set and solved by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Meanwhile, there was high political and public consensus inside these countries on these matters.
What is the situation on these matters like in the South Caucasus: although Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have also declared construction of democratic states their main aim, this is being realized in actual life rather inconsistently and with great difficulty. Abuse of human rights, restriction of freedoms of the mass media, forgery of elections are getting rather widespread and common phenomena in our countries. Only Georgia should be set aside from here, where after the “Rose Revolution” there is a tendency towards democratization of the society and more consistent strive to hold political reforms in the country.
There are also great differences in positions of the SC countries concerning integration into NATO and the EU. If Georgia, in the name of its official authorities and actually all political forces, has announced about its strive to become a member of the European Union and NATO, then Azerbaijan doesn’t talk much about integration into NATO while talking about its sought to integrate into the EU. In case of Armenia, entrance into NATO and the EU has not yet been included into the foreign policy agenda of Armenia.
However, it is noteworthy that recently Armenia has become to work with the European Union and NATO more actively. So, in December 2005 the IPAP with NATO was signed, and on 14 November 2006 the Action Plan was ratified with the European Union within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).
3. Common perception of main challenges and threats. As far as an outsider can observe, the Baltic countries are able to realize better that the main challenges and threats aimed at them are. With some reservation, they all agree that most significant problems for the Baltic countries stem from the “East”. In case of the South Caucasus the situation is much more complicated. For Georgia main threat comes from the “North”, i.e. from Russia (Turkey is one of the three strategic partners of Georgia together with the USA and Ukraine, and Georgia has friendly relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan). For Armenia main threat still stems from Turkey even today, at least this perception can be traced with most of the political elite of Armenia, although quite often in real life threats for Armenia originate from the “North”, too. It is sufficient to remember the “gas problem” Russia organized for the CIS countries in December 2005 raising the prices of gas 2 to 4 times for Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine in the very middle of winter. And closure of the control-station “Upper Lars” on the Georgian-Russian border in fact means threat to economic security of Armenia.
Nevertheless, it should be noted here, that even having such a complicated situation in the region all the three countries of the South Caucasus respond to global threats like international terrorism, drug spreading, etc. in a single way. Besides, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are members of the anti-Iraqi (anti-Hussein) coalition. All the three countries also have their peacekeeping contingents in Kosovo.
Evidently countries of the region frequently respond to global challenges and threats in the same way, which gives a chance for rapprochement of their positions in such matters. It would be rather interesting if the countries of the region were able to come out from the same positions also in the case of the Iranian nuclear program. This could contribute positively to the settlement of the “Iranian crisis”, as Armenia and Azerbaijan, being Iran’s immediate neighbors, are interested in the peaceful solution of the problem. It is clear that implementation of sanctions against Iran, including force variations to solve the crisis, is due to cause serious tension in the South Caucasian region. If the SC countries realized this, they could play a more active, even mediating, role in the present situation making Iran’s position more conceivable and accessible for the world community.

4. For the region to function as a single unit it is necessary to have a common image and acceptance of what a region is. It means a region is not merely a geographic unit, but also its image and perception of the SC by its citizens as a single whole. It is noteworthy to mention the problem of attitude towards Neighbors. Thus, the Baltic countries right after they became independent, began quite quickly and efficiently to build their relations with one another, with their neighbors within the region, as well as outside it. It means the principle of good neighborly relations and serious attitude towards regional cooperation (coordination of positions on main issues with international organizations, settlement of any disputable matter through negotiations, mutual solidarity, etc.) lay as the cornerstone of policy of these countries. At least this is how it can be perceived from Armenia.
Unfortunately we cannot say the same about the countries of the South Caucasus as the idea of the “Common Caucasian Home”, which is so popular in Georgia, does not find appropriate support in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ideas to build relations with neighbors are not of priority importance for most of the political elite of Armenia who think that many problems can be solved applying to actors outside the region.
5. Existence or lack of regional conflicts. In case of the Baltic region we see absence of regional conflicts. As to the South Caucasus, then here we can observe several grave conflicts (Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) that have gone through the war phase and at present are in “frozen situation”. The fact that these conflicts haven’t been settled is a serious factor hindering regional South Caucasian cooperation.
What should be done by the authorities and the society of the SC countries to start more active three-lateral cooperation in the region? On its part Armenia could make some steps in this direction:• Conduct more independent and consistent foreign policy;• Define priorities of its foreign policy by making a political decision about strive to become a NATO and an EU member;• Armenia should be ready for compromise, which means for hard and rather unpopular decisions on the Karabakh conflict;• Should give up putting forward preliminary conditions for normalizing relations with Turkey (i.e. not to set the issue of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 at the peak of its foreign policy, leaving the solution of this matter to historians, the society and the Armenian Diaspora);• Armenia’s unilateral actions on normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey are just another positive resource;• Institutions of the civic society of Armenia should act more actively in the direction of democratization of the Armenian society and regional cooperation.
Certainly, these steps of Armenia suppose counter actions on the part of the neighbors. Turkey could give up putting forward preliminary conditions for normalizing relations with Armenia (foe example, renouncing demands concerning the Karabakh conflict, among which are demands to withdraw Armenian military formations from the “territories under control”). Azerbaijan, in its turn, should be ready for mutual concessions and compromise in the matter of settling the Karabakh conflict. Besides, conducting regional and trans-regional projects (oil, gas, energy, communication, and transport) Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia could promote Armenia’s involvement in these projects.
Today Azerbaijan connects regional cooperation and involvement of Armenia in it with the solution of the Karabakh conflict, i.e. it thinks that cooperation with Armenia is possible only after the Karabakh conflict has been settled. Meanwhile, one should call to mind the 55-year post-war experience of European integration, which showed that it is through the process of economic, scientific and cultural cooperation that most complicated conflicts between states are settled.

This article was published in the edition that comprises materials of four international seminars held in Armenia in 2006 by the Analytical Canter on Globalization and Regional Cooperation, with support of Friendrich-Ebert-Stiftung.Antares, 2007

Also You can find the article: http://domkaukaski.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=184&Itemid=37

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